So that the definition does not distinguish the
thing designed. Nay, further, even when we perceive the turpitude
tending to the destruction of its subject, we may still be sensible
of a ridiculous appearance, till the ruin become imminent, and the
keener sensations of pity or terror banish the ludicrous
apprehension from our minds; for the sensation of ridicule is not a
bare perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, but a
passion or emotion of the mind consequential to that perception; so
that the mind may perceive the agreement or disagreement, and yet
not feel the ridiculous, because it is engrossed by a more violent
emotion. Thus it happens that some men think those objects ridiculous,
to which others cannot endure to apply the name, because in them
they excite a much intenser and more important feeling. And this
difference, among other causes, has brought a good deal of confusion
into this question.
'That which makes objects ridiculous is some ground of admiration or
esteem connected with other more general circumstances comparatively
worthless or deformed; or it is some circumstance of turpitude or
deformity connected with what is in general excellent or beautiful:
the inconsistent properties existing either in the objects themselves,
or in the apprehension of the person to whom they relate, belonging
always to the same order or class of being, implying sentiment or
design, and exciting no acute or vehement emotion of the heart.
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